1. Introduction.-Given an arithmetic function f(n) possessing a mean value in the sense that j f(n) --' cx, c $ 0, as x --a, the question was n.< x raised by Gauss as to the persistence of the mean value if one takes the moving average E f(n)/y, where y = y(x) -o as x --c. Two x < n< x + y interesting problems of this genre are those of the distribution of squarefree numbers in small intervals, and, in particular, the determination of the maximum distance between consecutive squarefree numbers, and the similar question for numbers which are the sum of two squares. The first problem involves the estimation of the sum E pu2(n) while the second rex < n < x + y quires the estimation of E r(n).
x<n<x+y More generally, we may take a function such as d(n), the Dirichlet divisor function, which has the mean-value log x and seek to determine the functions y(x) for which E d(n) -y log x as x --o. It is clear x < n < x + y that any error term in the mean-value formula such as E f(n) = cx + If we prove that S2(z) -E y2(x), it will follow, with some slight additional assumptions concerning y(x), that F(x, y) has the normal order y.
In this way we can show that E r(n) has the normal order 4y/7r2 z < n < x + y if y = (log X)a, and that E d(n) has normal order log x if y = x.u.x+y (log x) +a, a > 0. Interestingly enough, the result is not true if y = log x. The proofs of these and many further results will be presented in a subsequent publication.
3. The Squarefree Problem.-For the case of the distribution of square free integers we can obtain a very sharp result using only the evaluation of Si(Z) and the following lemma, itself of interest. THEOREM 2. If lim y(x) = X, and for some X, 0 < X < 1, y(x)/y(Xx) is bounded, then the normal order of , #2(n) is (6/1r2)y. In a wide class of social systems each agent has a range of actions among which he selects one. His choice is not, however, entirely free and the actions of all the other agents determine the subset to which his selection is restricted. Once the action of every agent is given, the outcome of the social activity is known. The preferences of each agent yield his complete ordering of the outcomes and each one of them tries by choosing his action in his restricting subset to bring about the best outcome according to his
